Distinguished members of the press, ladies and gentlemen,
Kimpact Development Initiative (KDI) presents this preliminary statement on the conduct of the 2026. Osun State Governorship Election. This statement is based on early reports received and processed through the KDI Election Day Data Room (EDDR), established to coordinate and analyse reports from
KDI’s accredited election observers deployed across Osun State, with the support of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).
For this election, KDI deployed 370 trained and accredited observers across all 30 Local Government Areas (LGAs), 332 wards, and 1660 polling units of Osun State. The deployment comprises 332 stationary observers assigned to specific polling units, 30 roving observers covering clusters of polling units within designated LGAs, and 8 faculty members providing senior-level oversight and independent verification of field reports.
This preliminary statement reflects reports received as of 12:00 pm on Election Day and therefore provides an early snapshot of the electoral process. It is not a final assessment of the election or its outcome. KDI will issue a comprehensive end-of-day statement after receiving, verifying, cleaning, and analysing reports covering the full range of observation indicators.
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
KDI’s preliminary observations are organised around key indicators of electoral administration, technology performance, voter access, political conduct, and election-day security.
Polling Unit Set-Up and Opening of Polls
KDI observers monitored the arrival of INEC officials, delivery and condition of election materials, the establishment of polling units, and the commencement of voting. Early reports indicate that 56.1% of polling units reporting to the EDDR recorded the arrival of INEC officials early or on time, while 43.0% reported late arrival. The concentration of late-arrival reports was highest in Ifedayo, Osogbo, Ola-Oluwa, Ayedaade, Iwo, Ayedire, Atakumosa West, Odo-Otin and Irepodun, indicating that delays were not evenly distributed across the state. Despite these delays, the condition of election materials was generally positive at the time of reporting. 98.9% of reports indicated that election materials were intact, while 1.1% reported materials that were not intact.
Among the materials reported as missing or unavailable, BVAS accounted for 1.1% of reports; notably, Open Space Awobiogun Junction (Western Sun Int’l Hotel) in Ward Alajue II, Ede South LGA and in less than 20 minutes, the BVAS was sent from the RAC. The commencement-of-polls data provide a related indication of the operational effect of these delays.
The EDDR recorded 79.3% of polling observations as commencing before 8:45 am, 19.8% between 8:45 am and 9:59 am, and 0.9% at 10:00 am or later. The implication is that while the majority of polling units were able to establish operations within the expected early-morning period, timely commencement was not uniform across the state. The concentration of delays in particular LGAs warrants continued monitoring because late commencement may place additional pressure on polling operations later in the day. KDI will continue to assess whether early delays translate into extended voting periods, voter congestion, or other operational challenges.
Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) Functionality, Accreditation and Voting: KDI observers monitored the functionality and use of the BVAS, with particular attention to authentication success, processing time, technical difficulties, and the operational effect of device performance on voter accreditation. Preliminary EDDR data indicates a BVAS success rate of 84.7%, compared with a 15.3% failure rate among the accreditation attempts captured by the monitoring system.
The data also shows variation in the time required to accredit voters. Of the accreditation time observed, BVAS accredited voters in a record time between one and two minutes. This suggests that although BVAS was functioning successfully in a substantial majority of observed cases, the experience was not uniform across polling locations.
BVAS-related challenges were particularly concentrated in Ifedayo, Ife North, Osogbo, Ayedaade, Irepodun, Iwo and Egbedore, which recorded the highest number of reported BVAS failure observations in the EDDR at the time of this statement. The implication is that BVAS performance is emerging as an important operational variable in the early conduct of the election. A 15.3% reported failure rate warrants continued attention, particularly where technical difficulties coincide with long accreditation times or voter queues. KDI will continue to assess whether these challenges are isolated technical events or whether they are creating systematic delays or barriers to voter participation in particular locations.
Conduct of Party Agents and Interference
KDI monitored the conduct and presence of party agents, with particular attention to interference with polling operations, attempts to influence voters, vote trading and other conduct capable of affecting the integrity of the voting process. The EDDR recorded 17 reports of party-agent interference at the time of this statement. These reports represent approximately 4.9% relative to the observations recording party-agent conduct. KDI also recorded 7 reports of security-agent interference in polling activities.
The data indicate that reported interference remains limited relative to the volume of observations received, but its presence across the dataset warrants continued monitoring. KDI’s approach is to distinguish legitimate observation by party agents from conduct that obstructs voting, intimidates voters or interferes with election officials.
Voter inducement reports provide a more specific picture. The EDDR had received 19 vote-trading reports from 2,127 total reports, representing approximately 0.9% of reports received at the time of the assessment. Reported actors associated with these incidents included party supporters, party agents and community leaders. Some reports identified more than one actor. Voter inducement reports were geographically concentrated in particular LGAs, with Odo-Otin recording the highest number of reports, followed by Irepodun, Ife North and Osogbo.
The implication is not simply that vote trading exists, but that the preliminary pattern points to political and community-level actors as important components of the reported inducement environment. KDI will continue to examine the scale, geographic concentration, actors involved, forms of inducement and whether reported vote-trading activity is associated with intimidation, political interference or other disruptions to voter autonomy.
Election-Day Security and Incidents of Violence
At the time of the preliminary assessment, the EDDR had recorded three (3) violence-related reports. These reports were obtained from Ife East (Modakeke Ward 3) and Ejigbo LGA, Ward 4 Unit 13, where political thugs reportedly invaded the polling unit, chased voters away and snatched election materials, disrupting the voting process. In Ife East, Police officers allegedly invaded a RAC and fired tear gas to disrupt the distribution of election materials at a RAC. The materials have been allegedly carted away. In Ilesa West LGA, Ward 8, Unit 7, political thugs disrupted the unit and chased away voters.
This early picture differs from the more elevated level of violence recorded during the pre-election period. KDI’s pre-election monitoring recorded 81 election-related violence incidents resulting in 15 fatalities between October 2025 and August 2026. The minute number of verified election-day violence reports received by the 12:00 pm cut-off is therefore encouraging. However, it is not sufficient, at this stage, to establish a broader pattern of election-day violence. Also, it should not be interpreted as evidence that the security risk has disappeared.
The more immediate analytical concern is whether security presence remains professional, proportionate and non-interfering as voter turnout, political actors respond to emerging results, and polling moves into counting and collation. KDI will continue to monitor both the occurrence of
incidents and the conduct and responsiveness of security agencies throughout the remainder of the electoral process.
5. NEXT STEPS
KDI observers will continue monitoring the electoral process through the close of polls, counting, completion and handling of result forms, electronic results management, and collation.
KDI will issue a comprehensive end-of-day statement after the completion of these processes and the verification of the relevant data. The end-of-day assessment will provide a more complete picture of the conduct of the election and will distinguish between isolated incidents, geographically concentrated operational challenges and broader systemic patterns.
6. CONCLUSION
KDI reiterates that this statement provides an early assessment of an ongoing electoral process and should not be interpreted as a final assessment of the election or its outcome. The evidence presented reflects reports available to the EDDR at the stated cut-off time and remains subject to further verification as the observation process continues. KDI remains committed to providing impartial, evidence-based information on the conduct of the election.
The organisation calls on all stakeholders to preserve a peaceful environment, respect the rights of voters, and allow election officials and other authorised actors to complete the remaining stages of voting, counting and collation without intimidation,
Bukola Idowu
Kimpact Development Initiative
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