GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION
Distinguished members of the press, ladies and gentlemen, for the recently concluded 2026 Osun State Governorship Election, Kimpact Development Initiative (KDI) established a dedicated Election Day Data Room (EDDR) to coordinate, verify and analyse reports from its accredited election observers deployed across the state.
The EDDR served as the central coordination and analysis hub for receiving real-time field reports and monitoring developments across election administration, technology performance, voter access, political conduct, voter inducement, security and other election-related incidents.
For the election, we deployed 370 trained and accredited observers across all 30 Local Government Areas (LGAs), 332 wards and 1,660 polling units in Osun State. The team comprised 332 stationary observers assigned to specific polling units, 30 roving observers covering designated clusters of polling units, and 8 faculty members providing senior-level oversight and independent analysis of field reports.
ELECTORAL CONTEXT AND PREPARATION
The 2026 Osun State Governorship Election was the final scheduled off-cycle governorship election before the 2027 General Elections. INEC’s official electoral calendar schedules the 2027 presidential and National Assembly elections on January 16, 2027, and the governorship and State House of Assembly elections on February 6, 2027. The election therefore provided an important opportunity to observe the implementation of electoral procedures and technologies that will be deployed for the 2027 electoral cycle, particularly in a context of competitive political contestation. Additionally, the pattern of the pre-election security environment pointed to a heightened security environment, where electoral-related violence dominated the security landscape in the state.
The election was also preceded by late judicial development concerning the participation of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in the election. This decision raised serious administrative and logistics concern as INEC had to reproduce affected election materials shortly before Election Day. INEC commenced distribution of the reproduced materials on the evening of 13 August 2026, less than 48 hours before the election, with onward movement to the 30 LGAs continuing overnight and into Election Day.
KDI commends INEC for completing the distribution process and preventing the incident from causing a wider disruption to the election. However, the episode highlights the operational challenges that late changes to the ballot can create for election administrators. Electoral institutions need sufficient certainty and lead time to produce, distribute and verify sensitive materials, as well as to coordinate personnel and logistics.
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS
KDI monitored the condition of election materials when they arrived at the polling units and the commencement of voting. Based on final verified data, accreditation and voting commenced before the KDI’s operational benchmark of 8:45 AM in 74.5% of observed polling units, while 25.5% commenced after the benchmark. Delayed commencement was particularly pronounced in Ayedaade, Obokun, Irewole, Iwo, Osogbo, Olorunda and Egbedore. The concentration of delays within these areas indicates that geographical accessibility alone does not explain variations in polling commencement. Security personnel coordination and material distribution also require consideration. Additionally, KDI observed the condition of election materials upon arrival at polling units. In 98% of the observed polling units, the materials arrived in good condition.
TECHNOLOGY, ACCREDITATION AND VOTER ACCESS
KDI observed BVAS functionality, accreditation success, and challenges encountered by voters during the accreditation process. BVAS successfully processed accreditation in 84.9% of observed cases, implying a 15.1% observed failure rate. This represents a marginal improvement over the 82.6% functionality recorded during the 2026 Ekiti Governorship Election but remains below the 96% recorded during the 2025 Anambra Governorship Election he pattern across these elections does not by itself establish a significant breakdown in BVAS performance.
However, it points to a relative fluctuation of accreditation success rates in recent electoral exercises. The implication becomes more significant when considered at a national scale. If a failure rate of approximately 15% were replicated across a substantially larger national election, the number of voters potentially experiencing accreditation difficulties would be substantial.
Of note, KDI observers reported widespread difficulties with the recognition of voters’ fingerprints, which led to facial recognition being used extensively for accreditation in many locations. Particular challenges were observed in accrediting some elderly voters through both facial recognition and fingerprint authentication.
Similar difficulties were reported during the Ekiti Governorship Election. These recurring challenges suggest that INEC should assess BVAS performance not only through aggregate success rates, but also across different voter categories, authentication modalities, and device conditions. KDI believes that BVAS remains an important component of Nigeria’s electoral administration, but its reliability must become more predictable across electoral environments and voter groups
VOTER INDUCEMENT
3. KDI received reports of vote trading and voter inducement across the 30 LGAs of Osun State. Party supporters accounted for 46.8% of reported actors, followed by party agents at 29.8%. Voters accounted for 10.6%, while community leaders accounted for 9.6%. The inducements included food items, drinks and cash payments ranging from ₦5,000 to as much as ₦50,000. KDI also identified indications that inducement methods are becoming more discreet. Reports described the use of vehicles positioned away from polling units and small businesses, including food vendors and provision shops, as locations where payments were allegedly facilitated.
This pattern is significant because it demonstrates that monitoring conducted solely within the immediate polling-unit environment may not capture the full inducement ecosystem. Voter inducement can occur through networks and locations outside the immediate polling environment while remaining connected to the electoral process.
KDI therefore assesses voter inducement as a continuing electoral integrity concern because it can affect the conditions under which voters exercise independent choice. The prevalence and methods identified in Osun also reinforce the need for security and electoral stakeholders to adapt monitoring strategies to various/new forms of inducement that operate outside the immediate polling-unit perimeter.
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT, DEPLOYMENT AND CONDUCT
KDI commends the deployment and professionalism of the security agencies in the just-concluded election. Owing to the heightened cases of pre-election violence, the huge deployment of security personnel can be seen as a proactive response. In all polling units observed by KDI, security personnel were deployed, with the Nigeria Police Force and the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps being the most prominently reported agencies.
KDI observers generally reported that in the most cases, security personnel discharged their responsibilities professionally and contributed to maintaining order at polling locations. However, 7% of the processed reports received through the EDDR indicated alleged interference in the electoral process by security personnel. These incidents were recorded across Odo-Otin, Ifedayo, Ede South, Ifelodun, Atakumosa West, Oriade, Ife North, Obokun and Ilesa West. KDI also received reports linkingsecurity personnel to vote-trading activities. These reports constituted a minority of observations and should not be generalised to the overall conduct of the security agencies across the state. However, they demonstrate the importance of maintaining both operational neutrality and public confidence in the security personnel.
Security agencies play a central role in protecting voters, election officials and election materials. Their conduct therefore has implications beyond individual incidents, particularly in locations where political competition is closely contested or where pre-election tensions have been elevated.
ELECTION-RELATED VIOLENCE AND DISRUPTION
KDI verified 17 election-related violence incidents across 10 LGAs, resulting in more than 44 documented victims. The incidents included gunshots, physical assaults, intimidation and harassment. The first three incident types accounted for five (29.4%) incidents each, while the remaining incident types accounted for (2) 11.8%. Voting was disrupted in one PU (Iroyin Ayo Open Space, Ward Elejigbo D’/Ejemu, Ejigbo LGA), resulting in the cancellation of election in the area.
The geographical distribution indicates that violence was not widespread. Ejigbo and Osogbo each accounted for 17.6% of verified incidents, while Ife East, Ilesa East and Irewole each accounted for 11.8%. Odo-Otin, Boripe, Ifelodun, Ila and Ola-Oluwa each recorded one verified incident. The pattern is important when considered alongside KDI’s pre-election security monitoring. Between October 2025 and August 2026, KDI recorded 81 election-related violence incidents resulting in 15 fatalities across Osun State. The election-day figures therefore suggest that pre-election tensions did not translate into widespread election-day violence across the state.
KDI also recorded multiple reports of post-election violence and property destruction in communities including Ilesa, Iperindo, Atakumosa East, Modakeke and Ikire. These reports underscore that electionrelated security risks do not necessarily end when polling closes, and that the immediate post-election period requires continued monitoring. Relevant security and law-enforcement authorities should promptly investigate reported cases, identify perpetrators, and ensure accountability for the offences committed.
KDI calls on the Nigeria Police Force to ensure a prompt prosecution of the 295 persons arrested for various election-related offences and encourages relevant authorities to ensure that reported offences are investigated and handled through the appropriate legal processes. KDI also calls for appropriate information on case progression to be made available to the public subject to applicable legal and investigative requirements. These public communications should include the transfer of case files to INEC where applicable. Such transparency would enable civil society organisations and other stakeholders to track the progress of cases and engage with relevant institutions, including INEC, on prosecution. Timely and visible prosecution of electoral offences is essential to strengthening accountability and addressing the persistence of electoral impunity.
ELECTION RESULTS MANAGEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY
KDI monitored the counting, result documentation, and transmission of polling-unit results. The unexpected pause in the upload of results to the IReV portal began at approximately 8:30 p.m. and continued for more than two hours. During this period, KDI did not observe any public communication from INEC explaining the cause of the interruption or the expected timeframe for resumption. Given the importance of electronic upload of polling-unit results to IReV for public scrutiny, timely communication during such a pause is important to reduce uncertainty among political parties, observers and citizens.
KDI’s preliminary analysis of the results upload on the INEC IReV portal under its Ballot Integrity Project (BIP) identified several categories of discrepancies in polling-unit results .Indicator KDI finding Polling units with arithmetic error (inconsistencies) 260
Cases where accredited voters exceeded total votes cast (missing ballot) 82 Polling unit with registered-voter mismatches 11 These findings are particularly relevant in the context of the enhanced electronic result validation process introduced by INEC through the e-EC8A. The Commission has stated that the BVAS result-management system, through the e-EC8A, performs validation checks to ensure consistency before a result is finalised.
The continued identification of inconsistencies and other reconciliation anomalies in KDI’s independent analysis, therefore, raises an important operational question: how effective is the e-EC8A? Is it only geared towards reconciling discrepancies identified in accreditation figures before they enter the wider collation process, and is there a sufficiently transparent record of how such discrepancies are resolved?
KDI is deeply concerned about the use of e-EC8A in an election because its legal status remains unknown under the Electoral Act 2026 and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended. The INEC Guidelines and Regulations for the Conduct of Election 2026 introduced an electronic Form EC8A that performs an additional validation function before transmission of the physical EC8A.
The legal relationship between these two records is unknown. Greater legal clarity is required to prevent uncertainty during election petitions and post-election audits. The 82 PUs in which accredited voters exceeded votes accounted for require particular attention. This discrepancy is particularly concerning given the simultaneous accreditation and voting system currently in use.
KDI also observed a similar difference at the State Collation Centre, where 1,010,684 accredited voters were reported against 1,005,800 total votes cast, resulting in a difference of 4,884 voters. This demonstrates that the difference between accreditation and actual voting is not evidence of an irregularity. It does, however, underscore the importance of clear reconciliation between the different stages of the voting and result-management process. KDI, therefore, considers the continued occurrence of these discrepancies as an area requiring further technical review ahead of the 2027 General Elections.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To INEC
1. Improve election-day operational preparedness, including BVAS functionality and technical support, to reduce delays and prevent elderly voters from being disenfranchised by accreditation challenges.
2. The Commission should improve its crisis communication, especially around result management and IReV, particularly during upload interruptions, by providing timely and clear information to stakeholders to reduce uncertainty, misinformation and avoidable public anxiety.
3. Clarify e-EC8A validation rules and the reconciliation path for conflicting result records.
To Security Agencies
1. Strengthen pre-election conflict prevention and early-warning mechanisms to address political tensions and localised flashpoints before election day, thereby reducing the need for extensive security deployments during elections.
2. Ensure the prompt investigation and prosecution of individuals arrested for election-related offences, with transparent follow-up on cases to strengthen accountability, deter electoral violence and reinforce public confidence in the enforcement of electoral laws.
3. Publish or communicate appropriate information on arrests and case progression, subject to legal and investigative requirements, to strengthen public confidence in electoral accountability.
4. Security operations should be continued in the immediate period after elections to forestall possible post-election violence.
To Political Parties and Candidates
1. Promote issue-based political competition and responsible campaign conduct that reduces political tension before and during elections.
2. Pursue alternative dispute resolution for pre-election disputes or the election petition tribunal within available legal timelines.
3. Deploy properly trained agents who understand the entire process.
To Civil Society Organisations and Development Partners
1. Develop a year-round voter mobilisation plan and build on Osun’s one-million-vote participation
milestone
2. Strengthen civic accountability platforms that promote transparency and public oversight,
particularly around election results and the conduct of electoral institutions.
3. Support early-warning, conflict-prevention and peacebuilding initiatives that address political
tensions before they develop into election-day security threats.
4. Push for legal reforms to establish a timeline for pre-election matters, and it should terminate at a certain time before the election to avoid any potential implications for INEC procurement and logistics.
To the Media
1. Avoid amplifying unverified claims, inflammatory rhetoric and misinformation capable of escalating political tensions.
2. Use media platforms to improve public understanding of electoral procedures, result management and lawful dispute-resolution mechanisms.
CONCLUSION
The 2026 Osun State Governorship Election demonstrated that Nigeria’s electoral institutions, stakeholders and citizens can conduct and participate in a competitive off-cycle election without widespread election-day disruption.
Most polling units observed by KDI were able to conduct voting; election materials were available in the large majority of locations; and Election Day remained relatively peaceful compared with the preelection period.
The election nevertheless exposed weaknesses that should not be overlooked simply because the process remained broadly peaceful. Delays in election administration, uneven BVAS performance, voter inducement, reports of security interference, localised violence and discrepancies identified through result analysis all point to areas where institutional preparedness and accountability require further strengthening.
The conduct and resilience of the people of Osun also deserve particular recognition. In the face of reported and observed attempts to subvert the electoral process, citizens demonstrated a remarkable commitment to protecting their votes and preserving the integrity of the democratic process.
Their resolve reinforces an important lesson: democracy is sustained not only by institutions, but also by citizens who are willing to defend their rights and insist that electoral rules are respected. This civic resilience will be especially important during the 2027 General Elections and wherever democracy comes under threat.
For KDI, the central lesson from Osun is that peaceful voting is a necessary condition for electoral credibility, but it is not sufficient on its own. The credibility of an election also depends on the freedom of voters to make their choices, the consistent application of electoral rules, the professionalism of electoral and security personnel, the reliability of election technology, the accuracy of result collation, and the transparency with which results are communicated.
These lessons are particularly relevant to the 2027 General Elections. KDI therefore encourages relevant institutions, electoral stakeholders and citizens to use the evidence and experience from Osun to address identified vulnerabilities, strengthen institutional safeguards and protect the democratic process before the next electoral cycle
KDI will continue to support evidence-based electoral observation, research and policy engagement aimed at strengthening electoral integrity, citizen participation and democratic accountability in Nigeria
Signed
Bukola Idowu
Executive Director, Kimpact Development Initiative
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